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Story pathThe governors: Yang, Jin and Sheng (1912–1944)

Yang Zengxin

The mandarin who locked the province.

The man who ruled Xinjiang alone from 1912 to 1928, by banquet killings, by balancing its peoples against one another and by shutting the province off from the world. A Qing official from Yunnan, he came to Xinjiang in 1908, served as intendant at Aksu and Ürümqi, and seized power in the turmoil of the 1912 revolution. He kept order and taxes low but starved schools and roads, printed money and drew the province into Soviet trade. He was shot at a banquet on 7 July 1928.

How did he rule?

By keeping every rival close and then removing him. He took Ürümqi in 1912 with a guard of some 2,000 Tungans raised for him by Ma Fuxing, gave the Ili revolutionaries posts in his government, scattered them across the province, then had them arrested and executed one by one. In February 1916, when Yunnanese officers plotted against him, he invited them to a New Year banquet; after a few cups of wine his guards beheaded the leaders at the table, and Yang calmly finished his dinner. When Ma Fuxing, his own man in Kashgar, turned tyrant and hung the cut-off limbs of his victims on the city gates, Yang had him seized and executed in 1924. He summed up his method himself: when a cat catches a mouse, it makes no sound.

He held the many peoples by balancing them. Uyghur local headmen, Kazakh and Mongol chiefs and the khans of Kumul and Turfan kept their places and could enrich themselves within limits. He armed Kazakhs against Mongols and backed the conservative ulama against the new-method (jadid) schools. A spy network reported to him in person.

Sources: James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (London: Hurst, 2007) · Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia (1986)

Why did he shut the province off?

To keep outside ideas from unsettling his rule. He censored the mail, held the telegraph tightly, tried to keep newspapers from China and Soviet territory out, and blocked roads that would link Xinjiang to north China. He closed many of the new schools and let conservatives shut the jadid ones; even the colleges he was forced to open never held more than a hundred students at a time. Uyghur and Chinese historians alike count this 'keep the people ignorant' policy among the most damaging parts of his rule.

Money followed the same logic. With the old subsidies from Beijing gone, he printed four separate paper currencies for Ürümqi, Turfan, Ili and Kashgar, forced merchants to change silver for them and shipped much of the bullion out; he was said to keep a bank account in Manila. In 1927 the army took over 72 per cent of the budget, building and communications 0.13 per cent. Irrigation was the exception: between 1915 and 1918 grain yields rose by almost 40 per cent.

Sources: James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (London: Hurst, 2007)

How did he deal with Russia, and how did it end?

His real skill was with the northern neighbour. When the Russian civil war drove 30,000–40,000 White Russians into Ili and Tarbagatai, he lured General Annenkov to Ürümqi, detained him and sent him back to be executed, and let the Red Army cross the border to destroy Bakich's force. He signed trade agreements with the Soviets before Beijing had even recognised them, and in 1924 a treaty that opened Soviet consulates in five Xinjiang cities and Chinese consulates in five Soviet ones. By 1928 Xinjiang's trade with the Soviet Union was almost ten times its trade with China. The province was drifting into the Soviet orbit, and the new ideas he tried to shut out came in with the goods.

Opinions of him still split. A British consul in Kashgar praised his low taxes and safe roads; Forbes and Chinese Marxist historians call him a dictator dressed in Confucian morals. On 7 July 1928 Fan Yaonan, a rival he had kept close, had him shot at a banquet. Jin Shuren, his deputy, took power, and his far worse rule led straight to the risings of the 1930s.

Sources: James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (London: Hurst, 2007) · Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia (1986)

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